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In an article published last year,1 I argued that biography offered, or should 
offer if done properly, a paradigm example of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the 
understanding that consists in seeing connections’ (Philosophical Investigations, 
Part I, paragraph 122), a type of understanding that Wittgenstein identified 
as his goal in philosophy and which , crucially, is non-theoretical. Biography, I 
maintained, is a perfect exemplar of this kind of understanding and, as such, 
it is fundamentally mistaken, either to search for a theory of biography or 
to read or write biography as if it were in any way a theoretical enterprise. 
I developed this view through a four-pronged assault: 1. a survey of the 
scholarly, but non-academic literature on biography from Dr Johnson to 
the early twentieth century, seeking to identify the forces that pulled it in 
the direction of theory;2 2. an examination of the work of those biographers 
who have approached their task in a consciously theoretical manner; 3. a 
critical engagement with the recent theoretical literature about biography; 
and 4. an application to biography of Wittgenstein’s non-theoretical notion 
of philosophical understanding. 
 I want in this present essay to respond to a difficulty in my argument that 
centres on the notion of ‘theory’ as that notion is variously understood by (a) 
Wittgenstein, (b) some theorists and (c) the general public. At the heart of 
the difficulty is the thought that Wittgenstein and I may be using the word 
‘theory’ in an artificially and illegitimately narrow way that is not in conformity 
with its normal usage. This thought, as it applies to Wittgenstein (but not in 
connection with either my work or biography), has been explored in some 
depth and with no little subtlety by the late Oswald Hanfling in his article 
‘The Use of “Theory” in Philosophy’.3 Hanfling begins by noting a strong 
connection in Wittgenstein’s work between his insistence that philosophy is 
non-theoretical and his equally fervent insistence that philosophy is not a 
science. Philosophical Investigations Part I, paragraph 109, which contains his 
famous and oft-quoted remarks about theory (‘And we may not advance any 
kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. 
We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place’) 
begins: ‘It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific one’, 
an allusion, Hanfling persuasively suggests, to Tractatus 4.111: ‘Philosophy 
is not one of the natural sciences’.
 Does Wittgenstein think that saying that philosophy is not a theoretical 
discipline is the same thing as saying that it is not a science? Does he think, 
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in other words, that scientific theories are the only kind? Well, it certainly 
seems to be true that the words he uses to characterise theories are those 
most commonly associated with science. As Hanfling puts it: 
A theory, as indicated in those passages [Philosophical Investigations §109, 
126] is put forward with the purpose of explaining as opposed to describing, 
and the explaining is done by reference to something that is hidden, as 
opposed to lying open to view. Such theories may be hypothetical, and the 
problems with which they deal are empirical ones.4
What is being described here, surely, is, first and foremost a scientific 
theory.
 When characterising Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘theory’ in Philosophical 
Investigations, however, it is worth bearing in mind that the available sample is 
very small. In fact, paragraph 109 is the only place in the entire book in which 
the word occurs. It is nonetheless a crucial word. Elsewhere in Wittgenstein’s 
work, it is possible to find several instances of the word being used to describe 
what Wittgenstein is not doing. For instance: ‘What we do is the opposite of 
theorizing. Theory blinds’ (MS 133, 1946-47), ‘What we are not looking for 
is a ‘philosophical theory’’ (MS130, 1946), and, when his discussions with the 
Vienna Circle touched on the subject of ethics and the attempt to understand 
the notion of moral value, he remarked:
If I were told anything that was a theory, I would say, No, no! That does 
not interest me. Even if this theory were true, it would not interest me - it 
would not be the exact thing I was looking for.
What is ethical cannot be taught. If I could explain the essence of the 
ethical only by means of a theory, then what is ethical would be of no 
value whatsoever.
... For me, a theory is without value. A theory gives me nothing.5
In the same spirit is Wittgenstein’s reaction in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics 
when one of his students, Rush Rhees, asked him about his ‘theory’ of 
deterioration (Wittgenstein had earlier spoken of the history of German 
music as an illustration of the deterioration of a ‘very high culture’). ‘Do you 
think I have a theory?’ Wittgenstein asked, clearly horrified. ‘Do you think 
I’m saying what deterioration is? What I do is describe different things called 
deterioration’.6
 Might this horror of having a theory ascribed to him rest on an overly 
restrictive notion of what a theory is? After all, as Hanfling reminds us: ‘The 
scientific understanding of ‘theory’ is not, however, the only one’.7 The word 
is, of course, used in many other contexts. Hanfling mentions in particular 
history and philosophy, though he might equally have added, to name but a 
few, politics, literature, psychology, sociology, music - and, most pertinently 
for my purposes, biography. 
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 It is not just that Wittgenstein, as it were, turns a blind eye to the use of 
the word ‘theory’ in these non-scientific contexts. He also seems to dispute 
their legitimacy. So, anyway, one might infer from the following remark from 
On Colour:
Goethe’s theory of the origin of the spectrum isn’t a theory of its origin 
that has proved unsatisfactory; it is really not a theory at all. Nothing can 
be predicted by means of it. It is, rather, a vague schematic outline, of 
the sort we find in James’s psychology. There is no experimentum crucis for 
Goethe’s Farbenlehre.8
The most natural interpretation of this passage - an interpretation supported 
by the rest of Remarks on Colour9 - is that Wittgenstein denies that Goethe’s 
phenomenological investigations are a contribution to science and therefore 
refuses to accept that they should be regarded as constituting a theory, the 
clear implication being that only if they could be regarded as science could 
they possibly count as theory.
 The problem with this, of course, is that it does not conform - it does not 
even come close to conforming - to how the word ‘theory’ is used in day-to-day 
life, a fact which ought to concern anyone who seeks to pursue philosophy 
in a Wittgensteinian spirit. In a move that has enormous rhetorical power 
and raises in its sharpest form the difficulty both in Wittgenstein’s work and 
in my own earlier argument, Hanfling takes Wittgenstein’s famous remark 
in Philosophical Investigations 246 (‘If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is 
normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often 
know when I am in pain’), and simply replaces ‘to know’ with ‘theory’:
If we are using the word ‘theory’ as it is normally used (and how else are 
we to use it!) then theories are often of that [non-scientific] kind.10
Wittgensteinians, this rhetorical ploy serves to remind us, cannot afford to 
be indifferent, ignorant or insensitive to how words are actually used. When 
discussing whether Wittgenstein’s work is or is not putting forward a theory, 
or whether biography is or is not fundamentally non-theoretical, it will not 
do to ride roughshod over perfectly ordinary uses of the word ‘theory’.
 As Hanfling observes, despite Wittgenstein’s vehement insistence on 
the non-theoretical nature of his own work, the description of his own 
views as ‘theories’ would be in accordance with ‘an established usage’.11 
The ‘established usage’ in question is one in which ‘theory’ means nothing 
more than ‘view’ or ‘opinion’, a usage Hanfling describes as a ‘dilution’, 
analogous to the use of ‘argue’ to mean no more than ‘state’, ‘dilemma’ to 
mean simply ‘difficulty’, and ‘refute’ to mean merely ‘reject’. A word is used 
in a ‘diluted sense’, Hanfling explains, when its usage ‘obliterates recognition 
of the distinctive and interesting phenomenon for which the expression was 
coined’.12 Such dilutions may (or may not) be regrettable and irritating, but 
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their occurrence is common and if we are to adopt the Wittgensteinian view 
that the meaning of the word is its use, then, given that there seems little 
justification for excluding these kinds of use, we seem forced to accept that 
‘argue’ can mean simply ‘state’ and that ‘theory’ can mean simply ‘view’. 
This would appear to leave both Witttgenstein’s insistence that his work is 
‘the opposite of theory’ and my view that biography is fundamentally non-
theoretical floundering for lack of support. Worse than that even, they would 
both emerge as theories themselves - indeed, false theories.
 Of course, one might respond to this by insisting that what Wittgenstein 
wants to say about philosophy and what I want to say about biography could be 
said without using the word ‘theory’. What we want to say, it might be claimed, 
is that it is not the purpose of philosophy or biography to offer the kind of 
explanations that are offered in science, the kind that appeals to hypotheses, 
general laws and such like. And, clearly, this point could be made without 
trying to squeeze the various uses of the word ‘theory’ into a box too small 
to contain them, since it does not require any use of the word. But there are 
signs in Wittgenstein’s work that his point could not quite be captured in this 
way, that the word ‘theory’ is precisely the one he needs to use. After all, he 
could, in paragraph 109, have been specific that it was scientific theories that 
philosophers could not advance, but in fact he did exactly the opposite. ‘We 
may not advance any kind of theory’, he says there. And I, too, want to insist 
that it is the notion of theory from which I want to separate biography.
 Well, then, what is our notion of ‘theory’? In my previous article, I made 
use of a definition of ‘theory’ put forward by Richard Allen and Malcolm 
Turvey in their editors’ introduction to the collection of essays, Wittgenstein, 
Theory and the Arts.13 Acknowledging that theories ‘come in many shapes and 
sizes’ (p2), Allen and Turvey claim that ‘despite this variety, theories tend to 
possess two basic features’:
First, they unify a range of apparently disparate, unconnected phenomena 
by postulating an underlying principle that these phenomena putatively 
have in common and that can explain their nature or behaviour. Second, 
the common, underlying principle postulated by the theory - whether it 
takes the form of an entity, process, force, concept, or something else - is 
at least initially hidden from view. 
… By a theory we mean in this volume a form of explanation that possesses 
both of these features.
This is not a bad attempt to capture the notion of theory and has the great 
merit of being broad enough to apply, not only to scientific theories, but also 
to, for example, philosophical ones (it applies, for example, to the ‘picture 
theory of meaning’ in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). But, of course, it does 
not fit everything that is called a ‘theory’, whether in a diluted or (what one 
could perhaps in contrast call) a concentrated sense. And, in any case, it now 
seems to me that an appeal to a definition, any definition, even one as carefully 
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couched as that of Allen and Turvey, does not sit well with the Wittgensteinian 
insistence on the irreducible variety, the fluidity and the non-essentialist 
nature of our language. Like ‘game’ (Philosophical Investigations § 66) and 
‘number’ (§ 67), ‘theory’, surely, is a ‘family resemblance concept’. That is 
to say, there is not one thing that is the essence, the defining characteristic 
of the concept, nor, pace Allen and Turvey are there two such characteristics. 
Rather, like the various possible likenesses that go to make up the notion of 
‘family resemblance’ (the eyes, the nose, the mouth, the voice, etc.), there 
is a whole host of overlapping characteristics that collectively constitute our 
notion of ‘theory’. To be sure, the notion includes the forms of explanation 
that possess the two features singled out by Allen and Turvey, but it is by no 
means exhausted by them. And, when faced with something called a theory 
which does not possess those two features, it now seems to me that the proper 
response is not to deny the propriety of this use of the word but to acknowledge 
the variety of uses that the word has.
 A further appreciation of that variety might be gained from looking at how 
the word ‘theory’ is used in literary studies, where, of course, it has become 
a matter of some importance to clarify what, exactly, is meant by it. Some 
of the most notable attempts to achieve such clarity show how extended the 
family of concepts called ‘theory’ has become and reveal uses of the word that 
have only distant connections to Wittgenstein’s use of the word, the definition 
offered by Allen and Turvey, or the ‘diluted sense’ identified and discussed 
by Hanfling.
 In an article provocatively entitled ‘Against Theory’, that was published 
some twenty-six years ago and that aroused a good deal of debate and 
discussion,14 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels begin with this 
definition: ‘By ‘theory’ we mean a special project in literary criticism: the 
attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account 
of interpretation in general’.15 This use of the word ‘theory’, though clearly 
different from that defined by Allen and Turvey, is distinctly recognisable 
as a member of the same family, sharing some characteristic features. They 
both, for example, refer to something that seeks to bring diverse phenomena 
together through an underlying general principle. Where they differ is on the 
distinction emphasised by Wittgenstein between explanation and description. 
On the Allen and Turvey definition, something only counts as a theory if 
it seeks to explain a range of phenomena, whereas (though this is neither 
discussed nor made explicit by Knapp and Michaels) on the Knapp/Michaels 
definition, it looks like the ‘account of interpretation in general’ to which 
‘theory’ appeals might be descriptive rather than explanatory. In any case, 
theory on the Knapp/Michaels definition is certainly a long way from satisfying 
the rather strict criteria that Wittgenstein invoked in his discussion of Goethe 
(the existence of an experimentum crucis that would test predictions based upon 
it) or even the less strict characterisation of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘theory’ 
quoted earlier from Hanfling’s paper. Nor, finally, could one identify Knapp 
and Michaels’ definition as the ‘diluted sense’ discussed by Hanfling. What is 
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specified in Knapp and Michaels’ article, then, is a sense of the word ‘theory’ 
that is not identical with any of the previously discussed senses. Moreover, it 
seems to be one that has some established use. In the plethora of articles that 
responded to Knapp and Michaels, there was widespread acceptance of their 
definition of ‘theory’; what was controversial was their view that, so defined, 
it was inconsequential and therefore worthless.
 Not that everyone in the field of literary studies uses the word ‘theory’ in a 
way that is consistent with the definition given by Knapp and Michaels. In his 
book, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction,16 Jonathan Culler devotes his 
first chapter to the question ‘What is theory?’, and comes up with something 
very different from all the other answers discussed so far. He begins by noting 
that the word ‘theory’ ‘gestures in two directions’:
On the one hand, we speak of ‘the theory of relativity’, for example, an 
established set of propositions. On the other hand, there is the most 
ordinary use of the word theory. 
‘Why did Laura and Michael split up?’ 
‘Well, my theory is that . . .’ 
What does theory mean here? First, theory signals ‘speculation’. But a 
theory is not the same as a guess. ‘My guess is that . . . ‘ would suggest 
that there is a right answer, which I don’t happen to know: ‘My guess is 
that Laura just got tired of Michael’s carping, but we’ll find out for sure 
when their friend Mary gets here.’ A theory, by contrast, is speculation 
that might not be affected by what Mary says, an explanation whose truth 
or falsity might be hard to demonstrate (p2).
Culler’s characterisation of the first sense of ‘theory’ is so hurried and sloppy 
that it is difficult to know what, exactly, he is trying to capture. Is he, for 
example, trying to describe the scientific sense of ‘theory’? If so, he misses the 
mark woefully. It is surely not the defining characteristic of scientific theories 
that they constitute an ‘established set of propositions’. In fact, something 
is often called a ‘theory’ in the scientific sense to indicate precisely that it is 
not yet established. If and when what it states is accepted as established fact, 
it often ceases to be described as a ‘theory’. An example Hanfling gives is 
the prehistoric movement of continents, originally propounded in a ‘theory’, 
but now regarded as an established truth and therefore no longer spoken of 
as a theory. This is not to say that we never use the word ‘theory’ to describe 
established truths. On the contrary, we frequently do, and the theory of 
relativity is, perhaps (though not, I think, incontrovertibly), an example, but 
it does suggest that it is hardly a defining characteristic of scientific theories 
that they are established. Consider, for example, the way opponents of evolution 
often stress that it is ‘only a theory’. In any case, if Culler’s characterisation 
of the scientific use of the word ‘theory’ were correct, it would be impossible 
to propound new theories (since a new theory could not possibly have the 
characteristic of being an ‘established set of propositions’)!
16. Jonathan Culler, 
Literary Theory: A Very 
Short Introduction, 
New York, Oxford 
University Press, 
1997.
140     New FormatioNs
 More interesting is Culler’s discussion of what he calls ‘the most ordinary 
use of the word theory’, which seems on first glance to be fairly close to what 
Hanfling calls the ‘diluted sense’. However, it is not identical to that, because, 
on Culler’s account, the word in its most ordinary sense does mean something 
more than ‘view’ or ‘opinion’. What, exactly, that ‘something more’ consists 
in is, however, a little difficult to extract from Culler’s account. One thing is 
clear: a ‘theory’, on Culler’s understanding, is always speculative, whereas views 
and opinions are merely sometimes so. Culler’s discussion of the difference 
between a theory and a guess suggests another aspect in which a theory might 
differ from a mere view, but at this point his discussion gets rather muddled. 
Two interpretations of what he says suggest themselves: 1. if I use the word 
‘guess’, I am suggesting that there is a correct answer to the question under 
discussion, but I don’t happen to know it, whereas if I use the word ‘theory’ 
I am leaving open the question of whether there is or is not such a correct 
answer, and 2. if I use the word ‘guess’ I am implying that the truth of the 
matter, though I do not know it, can be fairly easy to establish, whereas if I 
use the word ‘theory’ I imply that the truth of the matter ‘might be hard to 
demonstrate’. Clearly, 1 and 2 are not equivalent; 2 is concerned with whether 
the answer to a question is easy, difficult or impossible to demonstrate; 1 is 
concerned with whether there is an answer.
 The way Culler understands the word ‘theory’ is further muddled by his 
remark that the speculation about Laura and Michael, if it is a theory and 
not a guess, ‘might not be affected by what Mary says’, whereas the truth or 
falsity of a guess might be settled by Mary’s information. I am puzzled by 
this. If what Mary says can be relied upon, then it would seem to me to settle 
the question, whether what we were discussing was a theory or a guess. And, 
if it cannot, then it no more settles a guess than a theory. Does Culler think 
that in ‘its most ordinary use’ the word ‘theory’ means a speculation that is 
immune to verification of any sort?
 In his further elaborations, Culler puts more distance between his sense of 
‘theory’ (or what he claims to be its most ordinary sense) and a mere ‘view’:
‘My theory is that . . . ’ also claims to offer an explanation that is not 
obvious. We don’t expect the speaker to continue, ‘My theory is that it’s 
because Michael was having an affair with Samantha’. That wouldn’t 
count as a theory. It hardly requires theoretical acumen to conclude that 
if Michael and Samantha were having an affair, that might have had 
some bearing on Laura’s attitude toward Michael. Interestingly, if the 
speaker were to say, ‘My theory is that Michael was having an affair with 
Samantha,’ suddenly the existence of this affair becomes a matter of 
conjecture, no longer certain, and thus a possible theory. But generally, 
to count as a theory, not only must an explanation not be obvious; it 
should involve a certain complexity: ‘My theory is that Laura was always 
secretly in love with her father and that Michael could never succeed in 
becoming the right person.’ A theory must be more than a hypothesis: it 
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can’t be obvious; it involves complex relations of a systematic kind among 
a number of factors; and it is not easily confirmed or disproved. If we 
bear these factors in mind, it becomes easier to understand what goes by 
the name of ‘theory’.
So much for the ‘most ordinary sense’ of the word ‘theory’, which, to my eyes 
at least, no longer looks very ordinary, requiring as it does (a) speculation, (b) 
epistemological uncertainty about whether the truth of the matter at hand 
is knowable or not or doubt about whether there is a truth of the matter, (c) 
theoretical acumen and (d) the absence of a testable hypothesis. In many ways, 
then, what Culler regards as the ordinary sense of the word ‘theory’ is not 
only not identical with ‘theory’ as understood by Wittgenstein, it is the exact 
opposite (for Wittgenstein, a testable hypothesis, allowing the construction 
of a crucial experiment, was definitional of the concept of theory).
 About the more specialist sense in which it is used in literary and cultural 
studies, Culler makes the following four points:
1. Theory is interdisciplinary - discourse with effects outside an original 
discipline. 2. Theory is analytical and speculative - an attempt to work out what is 
involved in what we call sex or language or writing or meaning or the subject. 
3. Theory is a critique of common sense, of concepts taken as natural. 
4. Theory is reflexive, thinking about thinking, enquiry into the categories 
we use in making sense of things, in literature and in other discursive 
practices.
This is indeed a rather specialised use of the word.
 Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed by Mary Klages17 also begins 
with a chapter called ‘What is Literary Theory?’, but her answer is different 
again to Jonathan Culler’s. ‘We all’, she says, ‘have assumptions about what 
makes literature ‘literature’. These assumptions, whatever they might be, 
constitute our theories about what literature is, what it does and why it is 
important’(p3):
In this sense ‘literary theory’ isn’t something you learn, it’s something you 
become aware of. You already have a theory, or several theories, about 
literature, but you may never have thought about them or articulated 
them (p3).
The idea that a theory, in this case of literature, is something we have without 
realising that we have it, introduces, it seems to me, a radically new sense 
of the word. Curiously, despite coming from the same region of academic 
life as Jonathan Culler’s definition of theory, it seems especially hard to 
reconcile with his use of the word, in either its ‘most ordinary sense’ or its 
more specialised sense. We surely cannot demonstrate ‘theoretical acumen’ 
through an assumption that we have never uttered and may not even know 
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that we held, and neither does it seem possible to criticise common sense, to 
engage in ‘thinking about thinking’, by such mute and unconscious means. So, 
whatever the ‘theory’ is that Klages claims we already have without knowing 
it, it is not theory as defined by Culler, nor is theory as defined by Knapp 
and Michaels, Allen and Turvey, Hanfling or Wittgenstein.
 It should, I think, be clear that among the extraordinary variety of uses 
of the word ‘theory’ so far discussed, there is nothing common to them all. 
Taking a leaf out of Hanfling’s book, we could take Wittgenstein’s famous 
statement about the multiplicity of things we call ‘games’ and replace the 
word ‘game’ with the word ‘theory’ and, in answer to the question, ‘what is 
common to all the things we call ‘theories’?’, reply:
Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be called 
‘theories’’ - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For 
if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.
(Philosophical Investigations §66, with the word ‘theories’ substituted for 
the word ‘games’)
So, am I now prepared to abandon my earlier claim that biography is 
fundamentally non-theoretical? Must I not now admit that, if, among some 
group of people, there is an accepted usage of the word ‘theory’ according to 
which it is acceptable and even commonplace to talk of a ‘theory of biography’ 
or to see a biography itself as a theory, then I have no grounds to object to 
such talk?
 Well, I think it means that I at the very least have to be careful how I couch 
my objection. Such an objection cannot, I now think, take the form of an 
assertion, such as: ‘Biographies are not theories, neither do they ‘embody’ 
theories, neither is there anything to be gained from a theory of them’. Rather, 
I think, it has to take the form of a suggestion. 
 In 1917, the British Army issued a directive to its medical officers to stop 
using the term ‘shell shock’ when diagnosing soldiers who seemed unfit for 
further service. The reason for this was that the term had become so widely 
and diversely used that it was no longer useful in determining the state of the 
soldier so diagnosed. For the term had come to be used to describe, among 
many other things: 1. a soldier so deeply traumatised that he had become 
severely mentally ill, could play no further part in the war and needed to be 
committed to an asylum; 2. a soldier whose nervous condition was such that he 
needed to be sent home for a relatively short period of convalescence before 
returning to the front; and 3. a soldier, worn out by fighting and the noise of 
shelling, who needed to be taken out of the frontline and rested behind the 
lines for a week or two. The Army was also convinced the vagueness of the 
term was also allowing it to be misused for the benefit of perfectly healthy 
malingerers who simply wanted to get away from the frontline.
 It seems to me that we have reached an analogous position with regard 
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to the word ‘theory’. In academic writing especially, the word has so many 
different meanings that its use masks more than it reveals, muddies more than 
it clarifies. So, it would be dogmatic to say of anyone who speaks of a ‘theory 
of biography’ that they are using the word ‘theory’ incorrectly. But, it seems 
to me, it would be perfectly appropriate to say that, if the word ‘theory’ means 
what it means in science, then it is misleading (at the very least) to speak of a 
‘theory of biography’, and, if it is not used in its scientific sense, then, like the 
term ‘shell shock’, there are so many things it could mean that its use is best 
avoided. For similar reasons, if we want to grasp what Wittgenstein meant by 
the ‘understanding that consists in seeing connections’ and why biography 
is a good example of it, we would do better - without accusing anybody of 
misusing the word - to keep ‘theory’ out of it.
